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Abstract. When the full stock of a new product is quickly sold in a few days or weeks, one has the
impression that new technologies develop and conquer the market in a very easy way. This may be true for
some new technologies, for example the cell phone, but not for others, like the blue-ray. Novelty, usefulness,
advertising, price, and fashion are the driving forces behind the adoption of a new product. But, what are
the key factors that lead to adopt a new technology? In this paper we propose and investigate a simple
model for the adoption of an innovation which depends mainly on three elements: the appeal of the novelty,
the inertia or resistance to adopt it, and the interaction with other agents. Social interactions are taken
into account in two ways: by imitation and by differentiation, i.e., some agents will be inclined to adopt an
innovation if many people do the same, but other will act in the opposite direction, trying to differentiate
from the “herd”. We determine the conditions for a successful implantation of the new technology, by
considering the strength of advertising and the effect of social interactions. We find a balance between the
advertising and the number of anti-herding agents that may block the adoption of a new product. We also
compare the effect of social interactions, when agents take into account the behavior of the whole society
or just a part of it. In a nutshell, the present model reproduces qualitatively the available data on adoption
of innovation.
PACS. 8 9.65.Ef, 89.75.Fb, 89.65.Gh
1 Introduction
What are the factors that determine the adoption by the
society of a new technology? The diffusion of technology
is an old and classic problem. The usual approach is the
one of Everett Rogers [1] and, according to him, people in
a society are Gaussian distributed over the time they take
to attach to the novelty. On the left side of the distribu-
tion are the innovators, the very first ones to adopt the
new technology —even when it has not proven to be useful
or reliable—, followed by the early adopters. At the right-
most part of the distribution are located the “laggards”
who accept the innovation reluctantly, only when the rest
of the society have already changed to it. The majority
of the population fits in the middle of the distribution,
between an standard deviation of the mean. Integration
of the Gaussian gives the total number of adopters as a
function of time. A stylized representation of Rogers’ ideas
is represented in Figure 1. Empirical results of the con-
sumers behavior of several technologies all along the 20th
century appeared in several sources, including an article
of Brimelow in Forbes [2], a New York Times article [3]
and several blogs [4,5]. All the curves exhibit a qualitative
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behavior similar to the one proposed by Rogers, with the
exception that in some cases fully adoption is not attained.
Indeed, some innovations were adopted by practically the
totality of the society, like the TV or the refrigerator, while
others, like the dishwasher, were adopted by a fraction of
the households. Also, the time scales are different for dif-
ferent technologies. Moreover, and as the title of Ref. [3]
remarks: innovations are adopted at faster speed today.
Examples of this are the following: it was necessary almost
forty years (with World War II in between) for the totality
of the households to have a refrigerator, thirty years for
90% to have a microwave oven, but only fifteen years for
almost 90% to have a cell phone. There is a tendency to
faster adoptions in recent times, even if the rapid grow of
the B&W TV was omitted in the graphic of Ref. [3] (as
discussed in Ref. [5]).
The rapid spread of technological novelties is probably
a result of massive advertising but also of some kind of
fashion and herding effects. As an example, many homes
kept the same phone set or refrigerator for many years,
while nowadays it is usual to change the cell phone appa-
ratus every one or two years just because of small changes
in the functionality upgrade. We should also mention that
in some cases the old technology simply disappears and
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Fig. 1. (color online) Dynamics of the adoption of a new technology, according to Rogers [1]. The extreme left of the Gaussian
curve (full line, in blue) correspond to the innovators, while the extreme right to those who resist to adopt. Integrating this
Gaussian curve we obtain the total number of adopters as a function of time that follows an error function (dashed line, in red).
there is no possibility of buying products with the old
technology. For instance, electronic injection in automo-
biles is the standard and cars are no longer made with
carburetor.We identify three fundamental external factors
in favor of a new technology: utility, advertising pressure,
and price. The factors against changing technology are
many, but we can mention the facility of keeping a tech-
nology which people have a good know-how, a comparable
or even better quality (compare the celluloid film with the
CCD of the early digital cameras). The lower price is also
a relevant factor. However, there is an important factor
that have been neglected in classic microeconomics the-
ory [6]: the social influence. Collective effects induced by
positive (or negative) externalities can be determinant on
the decision of buying a good [7]. Understanding these
collective effects is therefore of primary importance [8,9].
Social interactions are responsible of the timing in epi-
demics [10], opinion changes [11,12,13], outbreaks of social
and political unrest [13,14], and the willingness to buy
a given good [15]. Using similar methods other authors
studied the fashion market [16] or the dynamics of wine
purchasing [17]. The same kind of social interactions is
relevant for the spread of technological innovations. A de-
tailed discussion of social interaction effects may be found
in Refs. [8,11,13]
Here we describe an artificial society where the exter-
nal factors in favor of the technological innovation (util-
ity, advertising, and even price) are reduced to a single
parameter, that we call “A” and assume as objective, i.e.
the same for all the agents. This parameter is equivalent
in physics to an external field. On the other hand, the re-
sistance to change to a new paradigm, being because of
stubbornness, price or familiarity with the old technology,
is condensed in the idiosyncratic parameter, ui, which is
different for each member i of the society. Finally we in-
troduce a social interaction term that may act reinforcing
the change of technology, or going contrary to it, if the
agent resist to follow the herd. These last agents will be
called contrarians, as they will have the tendency to act
against the majority. The expression contrarian has been
introduced by Galam [13] but here we will use it with a
slightly different meaning, as it will be discussed below.
The article is organized as follows: In the next section
we describe the model, while in Section 3 we present the
results, first without the presence of contrarians, and then
with a given percentage of them, distinguishing the case
where the agents interact with the society as a whole or
with a reduced group. Finally, in the last section we dis-
cuss the results and present our conclusions, comparing
with the data exhibited in Fig. 1.
2 Model
We present a model aim at describing the evolution and
dynamics of adoption of a new product, implying a new
technology, after it is placed in the market. While con-
sumers can either adopt (buy) or not the novelty, our
purpose is to mimic, as good as possible (by compari-
son with available data) the consumers behavior at large,
using the minimal or essential ingredients. The new prod-
uct can exhibit a completely new technological content,
as the personal computer for example, or it may imply an
improvement over an existing one, like the new models of
smart phones. We assume there is a tendency for the con-
sumer to attach to the old technology for many reasons:
to save money, resistance to learn, etc. On the other hand
there are advantages in the new product, and the man-
ufacturer tries to emphasize these advantages by means
of advertising. Besides, for anyone who has witnessed the
teenagers filling the book-stores to grasp the last Harry
Potter or Twilight book, or the long lines at the computer
stores to buy the new i-Pad, it should be clear that the
“imitation” factor has an important role too.
Rogers [1] calls “innovators” or early adopters the peo-
ple who gather at the shop entrance the launch day: they
are not sure whether the new product is valuable, but they
want it because it is new and/or because her/his friend has
one. Regarding social interactions, other factors come to
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play, as in the professional environment, where it is im-
portant to share similar technology (smart phones, social
networks). Other elements are not less important and act
as external pressure, like the widespread use of credit cards
or e-forms for bank accounting, airplane or hotel reserva-
tions, and tax declarations. The present model tries to
include all these factors, plus an additional one: the exis-
tence of people acting against fashion, or against the ma-
jority. These are the individuals which resist to use cell
phones, microwave ovens, or make Internet shopping.
The model consider a set of N interacting agents, each
one characterized by two parameters. The first one is the
idiosyncratic resistance to change represented by ui (i la-
bels the agent), which is uniformly distributed among the
members and assumes values at random in the [0, 1] inter-
val. The second parameter, Ji, is the mean field coupling
with the other agents. It can take positive or negative val-
ues, the latter case representing contrarian agents. Its ef-
fect is to weight the interaction with the people that have
already adopted the new technology. Both parameters re-
main fixed during the adoption process. The marketing
force or advertising effect is represented by the parameter
A (the same for all members) which acts as an external
field.
The dynamics of the system is as follows: each indi-
vidual i checks the value of the pay-off of adopting the
innovation. The pay-off is defined as:
P = A− ui + Jin (1)
where n is the fraction of adopters of the new technology
(n =
Nadop
N
). Agent i adopts the new technology if the
pay-off is positive (P > 0). Otherwise it remains with the
old one. We remark that the pay-off of Eq. 1 with Ji > 0
is very similar to the one used in a study of markets with
externalities [9]. The difference resides in the fact that in
Ref. [9] the positive quantity is the willingness to buy, that
changes from agent to agent, and the negative term is the
price that is the same for all agents. Here the positive term
(advertising) is constant and the resistance to adoption is
negative and idiosyncratic (changes from agent to agent).
The present model, condensed in the pay-off expression
Eq.(1), is a mean field model, meaning that every agent
“feels” the influence of all the rest. As it was stated pre-
viously, we have added a second feature: the presence of a
certain percentage of agents with Ji < 0 which act against
the innovation, being the opposition stronger the higher
the number of adopters. We denominate these agents, fol-
lowing Ref. [13], “contrarians”, even when our definition
is not exactly the same of Galam. He defines a contrarian
as an agent that acts always against the majority, here, a
contrarian agent, when selected in the simulation, inter-
acts with the adopting agents with a negative Ji. While
Eq. 1 for Ji < 0 resembles an anti-ferromagnetic interac-
tion, it is not, because Ji does not weigh a pair interaction
between two agents, but it weighs the interaction between
one agent and the bulk.
Another variant of the model considers groups of in-
fluence. In this case, each agent, instead of experiencing
the effect of all the others, feels the influence of a subset
of them, selected at random from the population.
We also investigate a different distribution of the id-
iosyncratic resistance to change ui, considering a triangu-
lar distribution as the simplest approach to the Gaussian
distribution proposed in Ref. [1].
In the next section we present the results for the basic
model and the three variants.
3 Results
A mean field analysis of the basic model (no contrarians,
i.e., Ji = J > 0 for all the agents, uniform distribution
of ui, and no groups of influence) is readily straightfor-
ward. We first describe this case where some results can
be obtained in an analytical way and verified by the sim-
ulations.
3.1 Basic model
Starting with the whole population not having the new
technology (n = 0 in Eq. 1), the fraction of agents for
which ui ≤ A will shift to the new technology. They will
become the new adopters, or the innovators according to
Rogers [1], those who can be convinced by the sole effect
of publicity. How many individuals will adopt the new
product as soon as they are aware of it will depend on
the force of the campaign measured by A. As the val-
ues of ui are randomly and uniformly distributed in the
[0, 1] interval, the number of individuals with values of ui
below A is Nadop ≈ AN . Then, after the first time step
we have a fraction n = Nadop/N = A of new adopters.
In the next step (of an arbitrary unit time) those who
have ui ≤ (A + Jn) = (A + JA) will convert too, i.e.
those who had less temptation to try the novelty but will
go after seeing that some people already adopted it. If
J = 1, the adopters after the second step will be those
with ui ≤ 2A. Following in this way, the society evolves,
at constant pace, into full adoption after a finite num-
ber of steps, equal to A−1. If J < 1 however, the it-
erative process give rise to a geometric series describing
the dynamics: n(t) = A
∑t
i=0 J
i, with asymptotic value
n(∞) = A/(1−J). Thus, for J = 1, at any value of A, the
whole society will adopt the new technology; the intensity
of A will just determine the speed of this transformation.
For lower values of J there will be a finite fraction of the
population adopting the innovation. These results are ver-
ified by numerical simulations, as can be seen in Fig. 2.
The simulation is performed using a Monte Carlo (MC)
method, i.e., choosing one agent at random and apply-
ing Eq. 1. If the payoff is positive the agent become an
adopter. One MC step corresponds to choosing N agents
at random, where N is the size of the system. We can
see in the figure (Fig. 2) some examples of the temporal
evolution of the fraction of new adopters for N = 107,
different values of the coupling parameter J and a fixed
marketing value A = 0.01. The effect of the social inter-
actions is remarkable. It is evident that it is not possible
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Fig. 2. (color online) Fraction of new adopters as a function of time (in MC steps) for marketing value A = 0.01, system size
N = 107, and for different values of the coupling parameter J . The effect of the social interactions is remarkable. It is evident
that it is not possible to have full adoption when J < 1.
0 1000 2000 3000
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
 
n
time
 A=0.01
 A=0.001
 A=0.0005
Fig. 3. (color online) Fraction of new adopters as a function of time (in MC steps) for J = 1, N = 107 and different marketing
values A. Each curve is a single run. Even for a very small advertising (A = 0.001) full adoption is obtained if J = 1. Full
symbols correspond to pick agents randomly, whereas open symbols correspond to select them sequentially.
to have full adoption when J < 1. On the other hand,
in Fig. 3 we show a complementary point of view: con-
sidering again N = 107 agents, but for a fixed value of
the coupling parameter, J = 1, we show the fraction of
adopters as a function of time for different values of the
advertising A. We can verify that the number of adopters
increases linearly with time but the slope is lower than A,
the analytically predicted value. This is so because when
doing the MC simulation in a finite system, the popula-
tion is not covered exhaustively. As a consequence, agents
will change opinion only when “visited” in the MC dy-
namics. The probability of an agent not to be chosen in
a MC step is (1 − 1/N)N , which in the limit of large N
is equal to exp(−1); then the fraction of chosen agents
is 1 − exp(−1) = 0.632, so the slope is 0.632A (as can
be checked in Fig. 3). If the simulations are performed
sequentially, picking all the agents at each MC step, the
speed of the adoption is very close to A (open symbols
in Fig. 3). But even if the evolution is slower in the non-
sequential MC dynamics, the final values are not affected
by the type of simulation. Therefore, we decided to keep
the MC type simulation as we think it better represents
the dynamics of a real society.
The results for this kind of society are quite simple: if
the social interaction J is strong enough, after a time that
depends on the intensity of the advertising, the full society
will adopt the innovation. On the other hand if the social
influence is weak compared with the maximum value of
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the idiosyncrasy ui of the agents, only a finite fraction,
which depends on the values of J and A, will adopt the
innovation.
3.2 Model with contrarians
In this section we explore the effect of having a part of
the population reacting in opposition to the majority. We
call these agents contrarians and they are characterized,
in terms of the model, by having a negative Ji coupling.
All along this section we assume |Ji| = 1 and, as agents do
not change their idiosyncrasy in time, the number of con-
trarians will be constant in time. We define the fraction
of contrarians, fc, as the portion of the population having
Ji = −1. We have represented in Fig. 4 the fraction of
agents adopting the new technology as a function of time
for a fixed value of the advertising, A = 0.01, and four
different fractions of contrarians. The size of the system is
N = 107 agents. In the absence of contrarians we recover
the previous result: the entire society adopts the innova-
tion. Yet, a small concentration of contrarians is enough
to reduce the fraction of adopters by a significant fraction;
for example fc = 0.02 decreases the fraction of adopters by
a half. We must say, however, that these results strongly
depend on the size of the samples. On Fig. 5 we represent
an average over 100 samples of the temporal evolution for
different system sizes, for the caseA = 0.01, and fc = 0.02.
While in the previous figure (Fig. 4, N = 107) the fraction
of adopters converge to 50% for fc = 0.02, we can see that
for smaller samples the number of adopters may be big-
ger, up to 75% for N = 103. Also, the fraction of adopters
exhibit large fluctuations for small systems at all times,
as it can also be observed on Fig. 5. The dispersion goes
down with 1/
√
N . The finite size effects can also be visual-
ized by performing an statistical study over the final state
for the different samples. On Fig. 6 we have represented
by histograms the distribution of the asymptotic number
of adopters over 100 samples and four different sizes of
the system. We can verify that for smaller systems the
distribution is very wide —even Poisson-like for N = 103
agents—, but they became narrower as the system size in-
creases. After these considerations, in the following (and
as it was in the previous section) we consider a number of
agents N = 107.
Now we turn to analyze the simultaneous effect of ad-
vertising and contrarians. This is represented in Fig. 7 for
a fixed percentage of contrarians (fc = 0.02) and different
values of A. It is clear from the figure that there is a crit-
ical value of advertising to obtain the maximum adoption
of the innovation by the society. Due to the presence of
contrarians the maximum fraction of adopters is bounded
by 1 − fc. The number of adopters increases linearly as
the number of contrarians decreases or as the advertising
increases, until fc = A, when a clear change in the be-
havior is observed. Fig. 7 shows that when A ≥ fc the
maximum possible adoption (1− fc) is reached. This can
be best appreciated by looking at it from another angle:
for a fixed advertising value A, above the critical value
fc = A the number of adopter falls abruptly and in in-
verse proportion to fc, as shown in Fig. 8. Interestingly, a
relatively small percentage of contrarians may block the
maximum possible adoption of the innovation or force a
stronger advertising (i.e. A ≥ fc) campaign in order to im-
pose the innovation. Therefore, it is evident from Figs. 7
and 8 that the system converges to the maximum adop-
tion only when the advertising is strong enough, A ≥ fc,
and also that the number of adopters grows with time,
more and less linearly, up to a saturation point.
The results of the first two subsections can be summa-
rized in a 3D diagram. On Fig. 9 we show the final fraction
of adopters on the z-axis as a function of the social inter-
action J on the x-axis and of the advertising A on the y-
axis, for a fixed fraction of contrarians: fc = 0.02. A sharp
but continuous transition as a function of A is observed for
high values of J , while the transition is smoother and con-
verges to a smaller number of adopters for intermediate
values of J and A.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that allowing or
not the contrarians to adopt the new technology is mostly
irrelevant. In other words, allow them to check their pay-
off function (Eq. 1) to take a decision, or keep them in
a permanent non-adopter state, yields the same result.
This is because the higher the number of adopters n, the
stronger the negative effect on the payoff of the contrari-
ans, and thus it will be very difficult for a whimsical con-
trarian to become an adopter, even if her/his resistance
ui is low. In effect, our contrarians are much closer to in-
flexibles than to the contrarians of Galam [18].
3.3 Groups of influence
In the preceding section we have implicitly considered that
each agent in the society knows exactly what all the other
agents have chosen, because we used n = Nadop/N (where
Nadop is the number of adopters of the new technology and
N is the total number of agents) as the fraction of adopters
to plug into its payoff. However, nobody can have such in-
stant and exact account of how the rest of the society (or
country, or city) is reacting to the novelty. Most probably
he/she will have an imperfect sense of that through the
news, or better from what people around him/her (fam-
ily, friends, colleagues, etc) are doing. Besides, from the
technical point of view, we have seen that the size of the
sample is important for the results. Then, we consider in
this subsection that people interact with a group much
smaller than the whole society, i.e. the number of mem-
bers of the influence group is Ng << N . We calculate the
payoff using the same Eq. 1 but now with n′ = Nadop,g/Ng,
where Nadop,g is the number of adopters within the group
of influence of size Ng.
While in the real life the groups of influence can vary
from person to person, we make a simpler approach here
assuming that all the groups of influence have the same
size, and that the members of the groups are chosen at
random. In other words, at each MC step and for each
agent, we choose a set of Ng other agents at random from
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Fig. 4. (color online) Fraction of adopters of the new technology as a function of time, for four different values of the fraction
of contrarians: fc = 0, 0.01, 0.02 and 0.05. In all cases, A = 0.01 and N = 10
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Fig. 5. (color online) Finite size effects: Average time evolution of the system for different sizes. For each curve, symbols
represent averages taken over 100 runs. Inset: The standard deviation of the averages shown in the main panel. For N > 106
we can say that the evolution is independent of the size of the sample.
the population and the state of them is used in the pay-
off. So the size of the groups is fixed and the same for all
agents, while the members of them are chosen at random
at every time step. Notice that groups are not isolated
because any group has overlapping members with another
group (in principle it is possible but highly improbable for
a group to be isolated). We first analyze the case without
contrarians. We have represented on Fig. 10 the time evo-
lution of the number of adopters for similar parameters
than in the previous section: J = 1, A = 0.01, N = 107
and for different sizes of the groups of influence. It can
be observed that the system converges to full adoption
faster when the size of the groups of influence is smaller.
This means that the effect of small groups is more effec-
tive to spread the new technology. Comparing this results
with the case with zero contrarians, represented in Fig. 4,
is clear that the time necessary to converge to complete
adoption is much shorter with than without groups of in-
fluence. Moreover, we have verified that in the case of
groups of influence the determinant factor is the size of
the groups and not the size of the whole society. In other
words, the evolution of the number of adopters for a fixed
size of the group of influence is almost independent of the
sample size.
If we include now the contrarians, the results are very
rich and in some cases correspond very well to the adop-
tion empirical curves of US consumers, represented in Fig.1.
To study in full detail the combined effect of contrari-
ans and groups of influence we have represented different
cases in Fig. 11. One evident result is that the number of
adopters increases as swiftly as in the case without con-
trarians. However, and at variance with previous results,
even for A ≥ fc the system does not arrives at full adop-
tion, i.e. the effect of the contrarians is somehow ampli-
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Fig. 6. Finite size effects: Histograms of the final number of adopters for 100 samples and four different system sizes from 103
to 106, with A = 0.01 and a fraction of contrarians fc = 0.02.
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Fig. 7. (Color online) Effect of the advertising A for a fixed percentage of contrarians fc = 0.02. Each curve is a single run
with N = 107.
fied by the groups of influence: the smaller the group, the
bigger the effect. To verify this result, in the left panel of
Fig. 11 we have represented the results for a group of influ-
ence Ng = 10, while in the right panel we show the results
for Ng = 100. When increasing the size of the group of
influence, other parameters fixed, the system approaches
a behavior closer to the mean field results.
In short, the effect of groups of influence is very inter-
esting and induces behaviors that are different from the
mean field results, and closer to practical situations. The
importance of the effect of interactions in small groups in
driven the society to adopt a given opinion or decision has
been extensively discussed by Galam [13,17] and similar
results are also reported in ref. [19] when comparing the
effect of friends and global opinions when taking a decision
to buy or not a product. In any case, it is worth notice
that the adoption curves, when groups of influence are in-
cluded, look more similar to the empirical results quoted
in the introduction [1,2,3].
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Fig. 8. (Color online) Final proportion of adopters as a function of the fraction of contrarians for three different values of the
advertising. Each point represents the final state of a single run with N = 107 (lines are just a guide to the eye). Arrows indicate
the critical value fc = A.
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Fig. 9. (Color online) Final fraction of adopters as a function of J and A, for fc = 0.02
3.4 Triangular Distribution
A possible objection to the preceding results is that we
considered a uniform distribution of the idiosyncratic re-
sistance to change ui, while the hypothesis of Rogers [1] is
that this distribution is Gaussian (See Fig. 1). We can ar-
gue that the results with groups of influence reproduce in a
qualitative way the proposed curve of adoption of Rogers,
and also the empirical curves [2,3], but for the seek of
completeness we investigate a different distribution of the
idiosyncratic resistance to change. Let us briefly consider
a triangular distribution centered in 〈u〉 = 0.5, that is a
rough but simple approach to the Gaussian distribution.
On Fig. 12 we have represented the adoption curves
for a triangular distribution of ui and without contrarians.
The left panel shows the results for the mean field model
(i.e., the model with no groups of influence) and three
different values of the advertising A. In the right panel,
the effect of different sizes for the groups of influence is
displayed. It is worth to say that, in order to have the
expected behavior, we have to consider higher values of the
advertising. This is because the triangular distribution has
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Fig. 10. (Color online) Number of adopters for N = 107, A = 0.01, J = 1, and zero contrarians, with three different sizes of the
groups of influence: Ng = 10, 100 and 1000. It is worth to note that the convergence to a state of complete adoption is faster
the smaller is the group of influence. This means that close contacts are more effective than the “diluted” interaction with all
the agents.
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Fig. 11. (Color online) Evolution of the number of adopters for J = 1, fc = 0.02, and N = 10
7, for different values of the
advertising A and for two groups of influence: Ng = 10 (left panel) and Ng = 100 (right panel). Notice that the time scale is
different in the two panels, although the final fraction of adopters is, in all the cases, n = 1− fc = 0.98.
a smaller number of early adopters when compared with
the uniform distribution. We have also verified that with
the triangular distribution of ui, contrarians have a very
weak effect, so results considering contrarians have been
omitted.
Besides, the inclusion of a non-uniform (triangular)
distribution of ui brings a novel result which is showed
in Fig. 13. Such figure represents, in 3D, the asymptotic
fraction of adopters, n, as a function of J and A, exhibit-
ing a clear phase transition as a function of A for values
of J ≥ 0.5. This is in agreement with the phase transi-
tion obtained in Ref. [9] and it means that the number of
adopters can suffer an abrupt and discontinuous change
as a function of the advertising.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
We have presented a model of adoption of a new technol-
ogy that, in spite of its simplicity, captures the essential
features of the behavior of societies: a distribution of an
idiosyncratic resistance to change, the power of advertis-
ing, the effect of social interactions, and the presence of
people who act against the general behavior. The effect of
each one of these factors has been investigated separately
as well as in combination.
A relatively weak social interaction (either because of a
low value of the interaction parameter J or by a low adver-
tising A), can impede the adoption of the new technology
by the full society. Such can be the case of products with
a limited penetration like the dishwasher or the blue-ray
player.
Moreover, the inclusion of a small concentration of con-
trarians in the model is enough to reduce the fraction
of adopters by a significant fraction. They may force a
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Fig. 12. (Color online) Evolution of the number of adopters for a triangular distribution of idiosyncratic resistance to change
and for J = 1, N = 107, and no contrarians. Left panel: different values of the advertising A without groups of influence. Right
panel: different sizes of the groups of influence for A = 0.2.
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Fig. 13. (Color online) Phase diagram of the final fraction of new adopters n as a function of the coupling parameter J and of
the advertising A.
stronger advertising campaign in order to impose the in-
novation.
Regarding again the social interaction, we observed
that small groups of influence may be a determinant factor
both in the speed of adoption as well as in the percentage
of the population adopting the new technology. We have
verified that the interaction with small groups instead of
with the full society may explain the general behavior of
the empirical adoption curves [2,3]. Also, different speeds
of adoption may be obtained by changing the size of the
groups of influence, the strength of the advertising, or the
percentage of contrarians.
Considering a triangular distribution of the idiosyn-
cratic resistance to change can also result in adoption
curves with profiles similar to the empirical results. Be-
sides, in this case it can exists an abrupt transition in the
final number of adopters as a function of the advertising.
Otherwise, even if a relatively slow growth of adoption
may be observed in some cases in Fig 12, the triangu-
lar distribution does not provide a wide variety of speeds
of adoption. In other words, the triangular distribution
seems to be insensitive to the size of the groups of influ-
ence.
Our results indicate that, on one side, the acceleration
of the adoption velocity is a combined effect of the adver-
tising (Fig. 2) and of the size of the groups of influence
(Fig. 11). On the other side, attaining or not full adoption
depends on both, the strength of the social interaction and
the fraction of contrarians.
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Finally we want to emphasize that the present model
represents a mean field approach, regarding the interac-
tion with the bulk (or a random subgroup), without taking
into account any possible network topology. Remarkably,
in spite of that, the model is able to reproduce the essen-
tial features of the adoption of a new technology. However,
we realize that the effect of distributing the agents on a
network could have some relevant effect in the dynamics
of technology adoption, and such is the subject of a work
already in progress.
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